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Real Property
by T. Daniel Brannan
and
William J. Sheppard"
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys the case law and legislative developments in the
Georgia law of real property from June 1, 1996 to May 31, 1997. The

authors do not endeavor to chronicle every case decided or address each
action by the Georgia Legislature during that period. Instead, they focus
on those cases and statutory enactments that are likely to have some
particular significance for legal practitioners in their day-to-day practice
or that establish some new principle of law. During the past year, some
of the more significant developments in real property law have come
from the legislature, including the passage of the Georgia Electronic
Signature Act.1
II.

TITLE TO LAND

During the survey period, there were several interesting cases
involving disputes over title to land, including a few cases of first
impression for Georgia courts. The issue in one case, Thornton v.
2 was whether Carpenter qualified as a bona fide purchaser
Carpenter,
for value of realty and was entitled to protection against the claims of
an incompetent grantor seeking to set aside the conveyance. The
property at issue was conveyed by Ms. Thornton, an incompetent, to her

* Partner in the firm of Morris, Manning & Martin, L.L.P., Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia
State University (A.B., 1979); Mercer University (J.D., 1982). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
** Associate ofthe firm of Morris, Manning & Martin, L.L.P., Atlanta, Georgia. Emory
University (BM, 1986); Mercer University (J.D., 1992). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. 1997 Ga. Laws 1052, 9 1 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 10-12-1 to -5 (Supp. 1997)).
2. 222 Ga. App. 809, 476 S.E.2d 92 (1996).
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son and attorney-in-fact.8 The son then sold the property to Moody, who
had notice of the claim of another of Ms. Thornton's sons challenging the
validity of the conveyance to the first son. Subsequently, Moody
conveyed the property by quitclaim deed to Carpenter, and Carpenter
later sold a portion of the subject property to Edenfield. The second son,
who was appointed as Ms. Thornton's guardian, filed suit against
Carpenter and Edenfield seeking to set aside the conveyances and to
regain the property.4
At trial, apparently in an attempt to show that Carpenter was not a
bona fide purchaser, plaintiff contended that Moody was acting as
Carpenter's agent for purposes of acquiring the property formerly owned
by Ms. Thornton and that, consequently, Carpenter should be charged
with notice given to Moody of Ms. Thornton's incompetence. Carpenter
submitted an affidavit stating that no agency relationship existed
between him and Moody and that he had no knowledge of plaintiff's
claims prior to acquiring title to the property. Plaintiff presented no
evidence to contradict that affidavit. Plaintiff also contended that
Carpenter was put on constructive notice of defects in Moody's title to
the property as a result of the initial transfer of the property from Ms.
Thornton to her son, who was also her attorney-in-fact. Finally, plaintiff
contended that the conveyance by Moody to Carpenter by quitclaim deed
should be construed to charge Carpenter with constructive notice of
defects in Moody's title. The trial court granted summary judgment, and
plaintiff appealed.'
The court of appeals agreed that Carpenter was in fact a bona fide
purchaser.6 First, the court held that an assertion of an agency
relationship unsupported by specific facts and made by an outsider to
the relationship, is insufficient to refute a denial of an agency relationship made by a purported party thereto.' Because Carpenter's testimony that Moody was not his agent was uncontroverted by any facts
presented by plaintiff, no question of fact was presented for trial.
Second, the court rejected the second son's argument that the manner of
the conveyance by Ms. Thornton imposed a burden of inquiry upon

3. Id. at 809, 476 S.E.2d at 93. After the transfer, pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 29-5-1
(1997), Ms. Thornton was judicially determined to be incapacitated as of a date prior to the
transfer. 222 Ga. App. at 811, 476 S.E.2d at 94.
4. 222 Ga. App. at 809, 476 S.E.2d at 93.
5. Id. at 809-14, 476 S.E.2d at 93-95.
6. Id. at 809, 476 S.E.2d at 93.
7. Id. at 812, 476 S.E.2d at 94 (citing McDaniel v. Peterborough Cablevision, 206 Ga.
App. 437, 425 S.E.2d 424 (1992)).
8. Id. at 813, 476 S.E.2d at 95.
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persons dealing with the property.9 The court reasoned that Ms.
Thornton conveyed the property to the first son as her son and not as
her attorney-in-fact. 10 Finally, the court held that Moody's conveyance
to Carpenter by quitclaim deed did not alone constitute notice of any
claims against Moody as grantor.1
However, the appellate court disagreed with the trial court about the
effect of Carpenter's status as a bona fide purchaser. Rather than

relying on Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 23-119,12 the court found that O.C.G.A. section 13-3-24(a)'3 was controlling.'4 Under section O.C.G.A. 13-3-24, the controlling question was
whether Ms. Thornton was lucid at the moment she made the transfer
to her first son.'" Because that issue was for the jury to determine, the
court reversed and remanded for trial. 6
Williams v. Brown 17 concerned whether the meaning of the word
"children" in deeds conveying remainder interests includes illegitimate
children. Two tracts of land were involved-a twenty-five-acre tract and
a one-hundred-acre tract. The deed to the twenty-five-acre tract of land
stated that the land was transferred to Ralph Miller upon Milton
Miller's death. Upon Ralph Miller's death, the land was to be transferred to "his children then living."' If none existed, the land reverted
to Milton Miller's estate. The deed to the one-hundred-acre tract stated

9. Id.
10. Id. at 812, 476 S.E.2d at 95.
11. Id. at 813, 476 S.E.2d at 95.
12. O.C.G.A. § 23-1-19 (Supp. 1997).
13. Id. § 13-3-24(a) (1982).
14. 222 Ga. App. at 813, 476 S.E.2d at 95. Section 13-3-24(a) states:
The contract of an insane, a mentally ill, a mentally retarded, or a mentally
incompetent person who has never been adjudicated to be insane, mentally ill,
mentally retarded, or mentally incompetent to the extent that he is incapable of
managing his estate as prescribed by this Code is not absolutely void but only
voidable, except that a contract made by such person during a lucid interval is
valid without ratification.
O.C.G. § 13-3-24(a).
15. 222 Ga. App. at 813, 476 S.E.2d at 95.
16. Id. at 813, 476 S.E.2d at 96. As an instruction for the trial court, the court of
appeals discussed the degree to which plaintiff would be required to make restitution if the
jury determined that Ms. Thornton was incompetent at the time of the transfer. Id. at 814,
476 S.E.2d at 95-96. Specifically, the court held that restitution need be made, if at all,
only to the immediate grantee from Ms. Thornton. Id., 476 S.E.2d at 96. Accordingly, if
plaintiff prevailed, Carpenter and Edenfield would be entitled to nothing from plaintiff.
Because Carpenter acquired the property from Moody through a quitclaim deed, Carpenter
likely would have no recourse to recover the price he paid.
17. 267 Ga. 215, 476 S.E.2d 753 (1996).
18. Id. at 215-16, 476 S.E.2d at 754.
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that the land was transferred to Ralph and Eloise Miller upon Milton
Miller's death. Upon Ralph and Eloise Miller's death, the land was to
be transferred to "their children then living." 9 If no children existed,
the land reverted to Milton Miller's estate.'
Eloise Miller predeceased Ralph Miller. At the time of Ralph's death,
he and Eloise had no children together, but Ralph had three illegitimate
children. The heirs of Milton Miller claimed that those children had no
interest in either of the tracts, and the trial court agreed. Ralph's
children appealed.2 1
The question before the supreme court was whether the illegitimate
children were "children" under either of the deeds. The court declared
that it must ascertain the intent of the grantor. To do so, the court
looked to the law at the time the deeds were drafted.' In 1961 the law
provided that "children" in instruments of conveyance meant legitimate
children unless there was evidence of a specific contrary intent."
Because the court found no evidence that Milton Miller specifically
intended to convey to illegitimate children, the court concluded that
Miller could only have meant legitimate children.'
Therefore, the
court upheld the trial court ruling that the three illegitimate children
2
were not entitled to any interest in either of the tracts of land.
Justice Sears disagreed with the majority view that illegitimate
children were not "children" under the deed to the twenty-five-acre
tract.2 Justice Sears maintained that Milton Miller's intent must be
determined by reading the two deeds together." One deed conveyed
the property to Ralph's and Eloise's ("their") children, while the other
conveyed the property to Ralph's ("his") children. Justice Sears opined
that the different language in the deeds showed that the grantor
specifically intended the twenty-five-acre tract of land to go to all of
Ralph's children, regardless of their mother's identity, while the deed to
the one-hundred-acre tract showed the grantor's intent to convey that
tract only to the children of Ralph and Eloise.'
19. Id.
20. Id. at 216, 476 S.E.2d at 754.
21. Id.
22. Id., 476 S.E.2d at 755 (citing Banks v. Morgan, 163 Ga. 468, 136 S.E. 434 (1927)).
23. Id. (citing Thomas v. Trust Co. Bank, 247 Ga. 693, 279 S.E.2d 440 (1981)).
24. Id at 217, 476 S.E.2d at 755 (citing Pasley v. State, 215 Ga. 768, 113 S.E.2d 454
(1960)).
25. I&
26. Id.
27. Id. at 218-19,476 S.E.2d at 755-56 (Sears, J., dissenting). Justice Hunsteinjoined
Justice Sears in her opinion.
28. Id. at 219, 476 S.E.2d at 756-57.
29. Id, 476 S.E.2d at 756.
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Further, Justice Sears dissented because the majority opinion was
contrary to public policy and to the court's other decisions regarding
children born out of wedlock.' The concept of virtual legitimization
allows an illegitimate child to inherit from the father's estate upon a
showing that the child is in fact the father's child and that the father
wished the child to share in the estate.3 1 This concept is consistent
with principles of equal protection that prevent states from discriminating based on immutable attributes. 2 Imposing disabilities on an
illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept that legal burdens

should bear a relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing."
Justice Sears stated that "nothing in our case law prevents the
application of these sound principles to the transfer of land deeds," as it
is "unduly harsh to make children pay the penalty for the misconduct of
their parents.'
The supreme court faced another issue of first impression in Leeds
Building Products,Inc. v. Sears Mortgage Corp." This case concerned

the effect of a recorded security deed that, although defective, appeared
proper on its face. In Leeds BuildingProducts,Peach Communities, Inc.

("PCI"), a residential home builder, purchased construction materials on
credit from Leeds Building Products, Inc. ("Leeds"). To secure repayment of the purchase price, PCI executed security deeds to Leeds on the
properties PCI was developing. However, the unofficial witness to those

instruments never saw PCI's representative sign the deeds. Thereafter,
the defective deeds were recorded in the land records of the county
where the properties were located. 6
Plaintiffs purchased or financed purchases of the homes that had been
pledged to Leeds by PCI. Prior to purchasing those homes, plaintiffs
performed title searches regarding the properties. However, those title
searches failed to disclose the existence of Leeds' security deeds, and the
debt from PCI to Leeds was not satisfied at the time plaintiffs closed on

their respective transactions. Thereafter, Leeds demanded that
plaintiffs satisfy the security deeds and stated its intention to foreclose
the security deeds if payments were not made. Plaintiffs filed an action

30. Id. at 220, 476 8.E.2d at 757.
31. Id. at 218, 476 S.E.2d at 756.
32. Id. (citing Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979)).
33. Id. (citing New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 620-21 (1973)).
34. Id. at 220, 476 S.E.2d at 757.
35. 267 Ga. 300, 477 S.E.2d 565 (1996).
36. Id. at 300, 477 S.E.2d at 567.
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seeking damages for Leeds' wrongful declaration of default, wrongful
attempt to foreclose, fraud, and litigation expenses.3 7
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and the trial
court granted summary judgment to Leeds. The court of appeals
reversed the principal ruling by the trial court and held that although
the deeds were properly recorded and facially valid, they did not provide
notice of Leeds' claim because they were not properly attested or
acknowledged.s
The supreme court noted that it had not previously addressed whether
a recorded deed that was not facially defective provided notice to
subsequent purchasers sufficient to maintain the priority of the earlier
creditor under O.C.G.A. section 44-2-1.39 After a brief analysis,
however, the court concluded that "a security deed which has no facial
defects as to attestation is entitled to be recorded, and, once filed,
The court
provides constructive notice to subsequent purchasers.'
relied on three sources to support its finding. First, the court stated that
prior decisions from Georgia appellate courts implied that a deed
containing only latent defects provides constructive notice to subsequent
purchasers.41 Second, the court noted that a majority of other jurisdictions "have recognized that a defect in the acknowledgment of an
instrument required for recordation, which is not apparent on the face
of the instrument, does not prevent the recordation from providing
constructive notice to subsequent bona fide purchasers." 2 Third, the
court found this majority rule to be consistent with the purposes of
Georgia's statutory recording scheme and "consistent with ... modem
commercial practice."' To clarify the status of the law, the supreme
court overruled previously decided cases that implied that a latently
defective attestation negated the constructive notice provided by an
otherwise properly recorded deed."

37. Id.
38. Id. at 301, 477 S.E.2d at 567. The court of appeals agreed with the lower court's
finding that there was no evidence of fraud by Leeds. Id. Therefore, the case was reversed
in part and affirmed in part. Id. at 302, 477 S.E.2d at 568.
39. Id., 477 S.E.2d at 567; O.C.G.A. § 44-2-1 (1991).
40. 267 Ga. at 300, 477 S.E.2d at 566-67.
41. Id. (citing Glover v. Cox, 137 Ga. 684, 73 S.E. 1068 (1912); Nalley Chevrolet, Inc.
v. California Bank, 100 Ga. App. 197, 110 S.E.2d 577 (1959), overruled on other grounds
by Whitehead v. Southern Discounts Co., 109 Ga. App. 126, 135 S.E.2d 496 (1964)).
42. Id. at 302,477 S.E.2d at 568 (citing H.D. Warren, Record Notice--Acknowledgment,
59 A.L.R.2d 1316, § 25 (1958)).
43. Id.
44. Id. (overruling White v. Magarahan, 87 Ga. 217, 13 S.E. 509 (1891), and Propex v.
Todd, 89 Ga. App. 308, 79 S.E.2d 346 (1953), to the extent they were inconsistent with the
holding).
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It should be noted that O.C.G.A. section 44-14-33, which was at issue
in Leeds Building Products, was amended effective July 1, 1995 to
include a statement that "i n the absence of fraud, if a mortgage is duly
filed, recorded, and indexed on the appropriate county land records, such
recordation shall be deemed constructive notice to subsequent bona fide
purchasers." 6 This amendment resolves the issue that was before the
court in Leeds Building Products, at least with regard to security deeds
executed after the effective date of that amendment. However, the
holding leaves open the issue of whether that amendment applies
retroactively to deeds executed before July 1, 1995 that contain latent
defects other than in the method of attestation.46
In Reidling v. Holcomb,4 7 purchaser Greg Reidling sued realtors
Larry Holcomb and Jack Waldrip for negligence and landowner Jack
Hulsey for unjust enrichment. In May 1995 Reidling was shown
subdivision property by a salesman allegedly working for Holcomb and
Waldrip. The salesman showed Reidling an outdated subdivision plat
that incorrectly identified the property as Lot 4. The property that
Reidling was shown was in fact Lot 1. Subsequently, Reidling purchased
property incorrectly identified in the contract but correctly identified in
the warranty deed. Reidling, a builder, completed seventy-five percent
of the construction on a new home on Lot 1 of the subdivision under the
mistaken impression that it was the parcel he had purchased. Jack
Hulsey, who owned Lot 1, discovered the house on his lot and informed
Reidling that he was taking possession of the house and lot.'
The court of appeals upheld the trial court's grant of summary
judgment for Hulsey, reasoning that the sole cause of Reidling's damages
was his own conduct.49 Reidling was thus barred from recovery. The
court stated that the purpose of the recording statute is to afford
constructive notice to everyone of the existence of the recordation.'
The warranty deed from the grantors to Reidling incorporated by
reference a recorded plat that correctly identified Reidling's parcel.
Because the deed referenced the recorded plat in the legal description,

45.

O.C.G.A. § 44-14-33 (1982 & Supp. 1997).

46. 267 Ga. at 300 n.1, 477 S.E.2d at 567 n.1. The court specifically distinguished the
facts in this case from those in Higdon v. Gates, 238 Ga. 105, 231 S.E.2d 345 (1976). 267
Ga. at 300, 477 S.E.2d at 567. In Higdon the deed contained a defect obvious on its face.
Therefore, the deed, even though recorded, failed to provide any constructive notice to
subsequent purchasers of the affected property under Chapter 2 of Title 44. Id.
47. 225 Ga. App. 229, 483 S.E.2d 624 (1997).
48. Id. at 230, 483 S.E.2d at 625.
49. Id at 232, 483 S.E.2d at 627.
50. Id. at 230, 483 S.E.2d at 625.
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it had the same effect as if the plat were attached to the deed.5 ' The
court opined that a title examination, which Reidling failed to perform,
would have disclosed the mistake." Therefore, the court held that
Reidling was under constructive notice as to the true owner of the
M
land."
Cobb County v. Crew" concerned an action brought against Cobb55
County ("County") to establish and quiet title to three tracts of land.
The tracts were once part of a larger tract owned by Mrs. A.E. Collins,
across which the Georgia Railway and Electric Company ("GREC")
acquired an easement by way of condemnation in the early 1900s."
Five years after the condemnation, the property was subdivided and
conveyed; the deed referred to a subdivision plat filed of record in 1908.
The plat showed a street two hundred feet wide at the eastern end of the
property. The County paved an 18.5-foot-wide portion of the area shown
on the plat as a street.5 7
GREC used the easement for a trolley line until 1948 when the tracks
were removed. Thereafter, a driveway was constructed connecting Tract
1 to the paved road; that driveway ran across Tracts 3 and 4. Crew, Sr.
occupied Tract 1 from 1954 until 1990, first as a lessee, then as the
owner of the property. The deed by which Crew, Sr. acquired title to
Tract 1 described the easternmost portion of the parcel as the paved
road. Crew, Sr. also used Tracts 3 and 4 continuously from the date he
first occupied Tract 1. He "planted gardens which covered large portions
of each tract" and "maintained and paved the driveway.'M
Crew, Jr. contended that his father owned Tracts 3 and 4 by prescription. In turn, the County argued that it acquired title to Tracts 3 and
4 by dedication from Mrs. Collins. The County asserted that when the
plat was recorded in 1908, the County received the entire two hundredfoot width of the dedication shown on the plat as one street. Further,
the County asserted that, by paving a portion of the dedication, it
accepted dedication of the entire width of the road indicated on the plat.

51. Id. at 231, 483 S.E.2d at 626.
52. Id.

53. Id. Reidling's unjust enrichment claim was dismissed because no evidence existed
that Hulsey was aware of Reidling's mistake or intentionally failed to act while Reidling
constructed the house. Id., 483 S.E.2d at 626-27.
54. 267 Ga. 525, 481 S.E.2d 806 (1997).
55. Id. at 525, 481 S.E.2d at 808. After the action was filed, the parties resolved their
dispute concerning one of the tracts. Id. at 526 n.1, 481 S.E.2d at 808 n.1.
56. Id. at 528 n.3, 481 S.E.2d at 810 n.3 (citing O.C.GA § 22-2-85 (1982)).
57. Id. at 526, 481 S.E.2d at 808.
58. I&
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After a special master concluded that the petitioners were entitled to all
three tracts of land, the County appealed.5"
To establish title to land through dedication, an entity must prove: (1)
intent of the owner to dedicate the land to public use and (2) acceptance
of the dedication by the public.' The court concluded that based on the
evidence, the special master could have found that Mrs. Collins intended
to dedicate two separate streets: one in the area of the paved street and
another on Tract 3 with the trolley car easement separating the two
streets.6 1 That holding was based on the fact that the trolley line
already existed at the time Mrs. Collins' plat was recorded. Therefore,
the court concluded that it was unreasonable to conclude that Ms.
Collins intended to dedicate that portion of the two hundred-foot rightof-way to public use.'2 Furthermore, the court found that the County's
failure to exercise any control over Tract 3 for ninety years created a
presumption that the public had not accepted the dedication of that
tract." Therefore, Crew, Sr. was declared the title owner of Tract 3."
III. LAND LINES AND BOUNDARIES
Martin v. Patton" includes a comprehensive discussion by the court
of appeals on the law of determining boundaries. That discussion
provides an excellent resource for practitioners representing parties with
disputes over their property boundaries.
The land at issue in Martin was in Land Lots 76 and 77 of the fourth
district in Spalding County. A survey of the land conducted in 1931
used courses and distances to precisely describe the perimeter of the
property; however, the location of the land lot line that ran through the
property was not precisely located. The survey did describe the larger
parcel (in Land Lot 76) as having "83 25/100 +" acres and the smaller
parcel (in Land Lot 77) as having "59 85/100 +" acres." Later deeds
transferring the larger parcel described the parcel as "eighty-three and
twenty-five one hundredths (83.25) acres" in Land Lot 76, eliminating

59. Id,
60. Id. at 527, 481 S.E.2d at 809 (citing Moreland v. Henson, 256 Ga. 685, 353 S.E.2d
181 (1987)).
61. Id at 526, 481 S.E.2d at 808.
62. Id. at 528, 481 S.E.2d at 810.
63. Id.
64. Id. As a result of the court ruling with regard to Mrs. Collins' intent to dedicate
two separate streets, it followed naturally that the County failed to establish her intent to
dedicate Tract 4 (which ran between the two streets). Therefore, the court affirmed the
decision declaring that title to that tract was in Crew, Sr. Id,
65. 225 Ga. App. 157, 483 S.E.2d 614 (1997).
66. Id. at 157, 483 S.E.2d at 617.
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the "+"and excluding the phrase "all that tract or parcel lying and
67 being
in Land Lot 76," which had preceded the statement of acreage.
In 1955 the owner of the larger parcel hired the original surveyor of
the property to survey the line between Land Lots 76 and 77 and mark
it with iron stakes. Thereafter, the owner of the smaller parcel built a
fence along the line marked in the 1955 survey ("Westbrook Survey").
In 1982 the owner of the smaller parcel died, and a survey ("Storey
Survey") was conducted of that tract. The Storey Survey resulted in the
boundary of the smaller parcel being located 129 feet west of the fence
(on the larger parcel). The owner of the larger parcel then commissioned
another survey. That survey identified three possible locations for the
property line between the parcels: (1) along the line established in the
Storey Survey (the easternmost line), (2) along the line established by
the Westbrook Survey (the central line), and (3) along a line based upon
the boundaries of land lots located north and south of the disputed
property (the westernmost line)."
At trial the jury was given its choice of the three lines to determine
the boundary between the two parcels. After the jury concluded that the
Storey Survey established the correct line, the trial court entered a
decree on the verdict. The owner of the larger parcel filed a motion for
a new trial. That motion was denied, and this appeal followed."
Appellant first argued that by erecting a fence on the line from the
Westbrook Survey, appellee had acquiesced to that boundary line. The
court rejected that argument, holding that a fence erected on one's own
land does not establish an agreement to a boundary line as a matter of
law even if the fence is erected on or near a boundary line. Instead, the
intent of the parties controls.70 The evidence regarding the purpose of
the fence was disputed at trial. However, because the jury resolved that
issue against
appellant, that determination could not be disturbed on
71
appeal.

Next, appellant argued that the trial court erred as a matter of law by
"not finding that the location of a land lot line takes precedence over
acreage cited in deeds of coterminous landowners when both deeds cite
the land lot line as the common boundary."72 The court noted that in
an action to quiet title, the jury's verdict is intended only to resolve
disputed issues of fact. If the jury erroneously applies the law, the trial

67. Id. at 158, 483 S.E.2d at 617.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 161,
Id. at 159,
Id. at 160,
Id.
Id. at 161,

483 S.E.2d at 620.
483 S.E.2d at 618.
483 S.E.2d at 619.
483 S.E.2d at 619.
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court should set aside the verdict. 73 The court stated that when the
description in a deed refers to natural or artificial boundaries that may
be definitely ascertained, any description inconsistent with that
boundary must yield.74 The original plat in this case clearly referred
to the land lot line as the boundary During the trial, appellee's expert
admitted that both the Westbrook Survey and the 1994 Survey located
the actual line between Land Lots 76 and 77. Based on that admission,
the court concluded that there was "no probative evidence to support the
jury's verdict" that another line was the true boundary.76 Therefore,
vacated the jury's verdict and remanded the case for a new
the court
76
trial.
IV. EASEMENTS AND RIGHTS-OF-WAY
At issue in Sadler v. First National Bank77 was the disputed existence and use of an easement on property belonging to Sadler that
adjoined property leased by First National Bank of Baldwin County
("Bank"). A plat registered in conjunction with a 1975 transaction
between Sadler and the Bank's lessor showed the property in question
as an "access road."'8 The specified access road was sixty-one feet wide
and three hundred feet long with approximately two-thirds of its length
belonging to the Bank's lessor. The Bank subsequently paved a portion
of the access road for parking spaces, used the road to provide access to
its property, and landscaped other portions of the tract. Sadler
contended that even if an easement had come into existence, the Bank
had abandoned the easement. The trial court concluded that the Bank,
through its lease, was entitled to an easement to use the access road but
found as a matter of fact that the Bank had abandoned those parts of
the access road that it did not use to access its leased tract.7
On appeal the supreme court agreed with the trial court ruling that
the Bank had an easement but reversed the finding of abandonment.'
"It is well established that when property is subdivided and a conveyance is made according to a recorded plat, the purchaser acquires an

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id. at 166, 483 S.E.2d at 623.
Id.
Id.
267 Ga. 122, 475 S.E.2d 643 (1996).
Id. at 122, 475 S.E.2d at 644.
Id.
Id. at 122-23, 475 S.E.2d at 644-45.
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easement in areas set aside for the purchaser's use."81 The court
reasoned that the deed in the 1975 transaction recited that the tract
being conveyed was part of lands previously conveyed to Sadler."'
Consequently, the court held that an easement was created by express
grant and not by implication as held by the trial court.8 The "doctrine
of extinction by nonuse" does not apply when an easement is created by
M Moreover, the court stated that evidence of an intent
express grant."
to abandon, in addition to nonuse, is required to show abandonment of
an easement created by implication. 5 The court found that even if the
access road was created by implication, the Bank plainly evidenced its
intent to exert control over the entire easement through its use and
maintenance of the parking facilities and landscaping."
Descendants of Bulloch, Bussey & Co. v. Fowler 7 is another case
decided during the survey period that addressed a question of first
impression. That case involved competing claims to an abandoned
railroad right-of-way. The original owner of the land conveyed fee
simple title to Bulloch, Bussey & Co. ("Bulloch") in 1896. The land
encompassed a railroad right-of-way at that time, but no mention was
made of the right-of-way in the deed to Bulloch. Bulloch conveyed a
portion of the property to Fowler. The deed for that transaction
designated the railroad right-of-way as the boundary to Fowler's tract.
A dispute arose over ownership of the right-of-way when the railroad
abandoned it. Bulloch's successor-in-interest claimed title to the entire
right-of-way, while Fowler claimed that he owned the land up to the
centerline of the former right-of-way. The trial court ruled in favor of
M
Bulloch, and Fowler appealed."
On appeal the court stated that a deed identifying a road as a
boundary is generally construed as conveying the grantor's interest in
the road (up to the centerline) unless clearly intended otherwise.8 9
That rule "avoids the undesirable result of having long, narrow strips of
land owned by people other than the adjacent landowner.'8 The court
81. Id. at 122,475 S.E.2d at 644 (citing Walker v. Duncan, 236 Ga. 331,223 S.E.2d 675
(1976); Tietien v. Meldrin, 169 Ga. 678, 151 S.E. 349 (1930)).
82. Id.
83. Id. (citing Fairfield Corp. No. 1 v. Thornton, 258 Ga. 805, 374 S.E.2d 727 (1989);
Smith v. Bruce, 241 Ga. 133, 244 S.E.2d 559 (1978)).
84. I&
85. Id. at 123, 475 S.E.2d at 645.
86. Id.
87. 267 Ga. 79, 475 S.E.2d 587 (1996).
88. Id. at 80, 475 S.E.2d at 589.
89. Id. at 81, 475 S.E.2d at 589.
90. Id (citing 1 GEORGE A. PINDAR & GEORGnE S. PWDAR, GEORGIA REAL EsTATE LAW
§ 13-10 (4th ed. 1993); Johnson v. Arnold, 91 Ga. 659, 18 S.E. 370 (1893)).
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adopted that general rule for "use in construing deeds that have as a
boundary a railroad right-of-way." 1 Therefore, the court concluded
that the deed from Bulloch to Fowler conveyed title to property
extending to the centerline of the right-of-way.'s
Like Descendants of Bulloch, the case of Mersac, Inc. u. NationalHills
Condominium Assn' presented an issue of first impression. Mersac
developed a condominium complex called The Summit. Mersac sold the
units to the individuals who comprised National Hills Condominium
Association. Access to the units from the public road was by a paved
road called Mersac Court. That road was part of the common elements
of the condominium and therefore was not a public road. In conveying
the condominium units, Mersac failed to reserve an easement across
Mersac Court. Consequently, an undeveloped parcel of land owned by
Mersac was landlocked."
Mersac filed an action for declaratory relief to establish its right to use
Mersac Court to reach its undeveloped, landlocked parcel.9 5 In seeking
that relief, Mersac relied on O.C.G.A. section 4 4 -9-4 0 ," which permits
the courts to grant an easement over private land when the petitioner's
property is landlocked. The trial court held that Mersac was not entitled
to use Mersac Court and issued a permanent injunction to that effect.
Mersac appealed. 7
The supreme court affirmed." Although O.C.GA section 44-940
permits the courts to grant an easement over private land when property
is landlocked, the court may deny that relief when the request is

91.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.

Id.
267 Ga. 493, 480 S.E.2d 16 (1997).
Id at 494, 480 S.E.2d at 17.
I&
O.C.GA § 44-940 (1982). Section 44-940 states in pertinent part:
(a) The superior court shall have jurisdiction to grant private ways to
individuals to go from and return to their property and places of business ....
(b) When any person or corporation of this state owns real estate or any
interest therein to which the person or corporation has no means of access,
ingress, and egress and when a means of ingress, egress, and access may be had
over and across the lands of any private person or corporation, such person or
corporation may file his or its petition in the superior court of the county having
jurisdiction [seeking to have a private way granted]; ... however, where it
appears [that the land is not landlocked or appears] otherwise unreasonable, the
judge of the superior court is authorized under the circumstances to find that the
condemnation and declaration of necessity constitute an abuse of discretion and
to enjoin the proceeding.
97. 267 Ga. at 494, 480 S.E.2d at 17.
98. Id. at 495, 480 S.E.2d at 17.
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"otherwise unreasonable.'
The court held that "necessity [for an
easement] cannot be created by one's own voluntary action in giving up
reasonable access.""° Because Mersac had failed to reserve access .to
its own land, the court concluded that granting an easement would only
reward Mersac's negligence and deprive National Hills of the full use of
its property.'' Therefore, the supreme court upheld the trial court's
finding that the grant of the easement was "unreasonable.""°
Mersac also argued that it was entitled to an easement based on the
theories of "implied reservation" or "prescription." The court rejected
both theories." ° First, Georgia does not recognize the doctrine of
implied reservation. Second, to acquire an easement by prescription, the
claimant bears the burden of showing that he has exercised control over
the property, including the making of repairs. 4 On appeal Mersac
omitted the transcript of the evidence and hearing from the record.
Therefore, the court presumed that the trial court's factual finding that
Mersac did not carry the burden was supported by the evidence."0 5
V. SALES CONTRACTS AND BROKERS
In Scheinfeld v. Murray,'°" Mark Scheinfeld, a real estate developer,
executed a contract for the sale of real estate with June Murray and her
daughter (collectively "Murray"). Pursuant to that contract, Murray
agreed to sell Scheinfeld a tract of land "less and except for a 25,000
square foot lot, inclusive of Seller's current residence, said exact lot
The parties attached a
location to be determined by Purchaser."'
document to the contract containing an "approximation of the Purchaser's designation of lots.""° After execution of the contract, Scheinfeld
notified Murray that the lot design would have to be changed. Finding
the amended lot design unacceptable, Murray refused to go through with
the sale.'1°
Scheinfeld brought an action against Murray seeking specific
performance. Murray filed a motion for summary judgment, which the

99. Id&Prior to the current holding, the phrase "otherwise unreasonable" had not been
interpreted by the Georgia courts. Id.
100. Id. at 494, 480 S.E.2d at 17-18.
101. Id., 480 S.E.2d at 18.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 44-9-54 (1982)).
105. Id.
106. 267 Ga. 622, 481 S.E.2d 194 (1997).
107. Id. at 622, 481 S.E.2d at 194.
108. Id
109. Id., 481 S.E.2d at 195.
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trial court granted. The trial court determined that "the 'contract'
sought to be performed was void for want of sufficient description [of
the] boundaries and location of the 25,000 square foot lot."" ° Scheinfeld appealed."'
Specific performance of a contract for sale of land will not be decreed
by a court of equity "'unless there is a definite and specific statement of
the terms of the contract ' " " and the contract identifies "'the land to
be sold with reasonable definiteness ... [by describing] the particular
tract or furnish[ing] a key by which it may be located with the aid of
Scheinfeld contended on appeal that the
extrinsic evidence.'""'
preliminary designation of lots attached to the contract did indeed
provide the information necessary to identify the parcel that Murray was
to retain. However, it was undisputed at trial that the initial lot design
"did not accurately reflect the actual site on which Murray's home was
located."" 4 Therefore, the supreme court concluded as a matter of law
initial agreement was "void for want of sufficient descripthat the
5
tion."1
Scheinfeld argued that the parties had agreed to a modification of
their original contract. He based that argument on a series of postcontract documents exchanged between the parties."' However, the
court noted that the original agreement required modifications to be in
writing and signed by the parties. Because the record contained no
documentation signed by Murray that established the property's
boundaries, the court concluded that the parties did not modify
7 their
original contract so as to remedy the defect in the description."
The holding in this case demonstrates the importance of accurately
describing all realty to be conveyed. It should serve as a warning to
parties to transactions to firm up all aspects of a sale prior to contracting. Otherwise, one of the parties to an "agreement to agree" may
legally decide not to complete the transaction despite what may be
considerable loss to the other party.

110. Id. at 622-23, 481 S.E.2d at 195.
111. Id at 622, 481 S.E.2d at 195.
112. Id. at 623, 481 S.E.2d at 195 (quoting Williams v. Manchester Bldg. Supply Co.,
213 Ga. 99, 101, 97 S.E.2d 129, 130 (1957)).
113. Id, (quoting 2 GEORGE A. PINDAR & GEORGINE S. PINDAR, GEORGIA REAL ESTATE
LAW § 18-11 (4th ed. 1993)).
114. Id.
115. Id
116. Id.
117. Id at 622, 481 S.E.2d at 196.

272

MERCER LAW REVIEW
VI.

(Vol. 49

FORECLOSURES

In Wright v. Barnett Mortgage Co., 8 Barnett Mortgage was the
secured party under a promissory note and security deed executed by
Wright's predecessor-in-interest. When Wright defaulted under the note,
Barnett accelerated the entire balance and foreclosed on the property.
Barnett sent notice of the foreclosure to Wright and the original debtor
by certified mail. The notice to Wright was addressed to the property
and was signed for by an unknown person. However, Wright lived at
another9 address and had previously received mail from Barnett
there.
On the morning of the foreclosure, Wright notified Barnett that she
had not received notice of the foreclosure. Barnett foreclosed anyway.
Wright filed suit seeking to have the foreclosure set aside based on
Barnett's failure to comply with the requirements of O.C.G.A. section 4414-180."2 Both the trial court and the court of appeals disagreed with
Wright.al
The court stated that O.C.G.A. section 44-14-180 describes the manner
in which a "true mortgage" on real estate may be foreclosed.' Among
other things, that Code section requires that the secured party state the
amount of its claim. 123 Wright complained that the notice of foreclosure from Barnett did not specify a reinstatement amount. The court
rejected that argument, stating that O.C.G.A. section 44-14-180 likely
did not apply to a foreclosure under a deed of power.'2 Moreover,
Wright had failed to pay an amount that would have reinstated the loan.
Therefore, the court concluded that even if section 44-14-180 applied,
Wright12 could demonstrate no prejudice from the allegedly defective
notice. 6
Wright also argued that Barnett had failed to comply with the
requirements of O.C.G.A. section 44-14-162.2.'26 Under that Code
section, notice of foreclosure pursuant to a deed under power of sale
must be given to the debtor in writing and sent "by registered or
certified mail, return receipt requested, to the property address or to

118. 226 Ga. App. 94, 485 S.E.2d 583 (1997).
119.

Id. at 94, 485 S.E.2d at 584.

120. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-180 (1982).
121. 226 Ga. App. at 96-97, 485 S.E.2d at 585-86.
122. Id at 96, 485 S.E.2d at 585.
123.

O.C.GA. § 44-14-180(1).

124. 226 Ga. App. at 96, 485 S.E.2d at 585 (citing Kennedy v. Gwinnett Commercial
Bank, 155 Ga. App. 327, 270 S.E.2d 867 (1980)).

125. Id
126. I& at 97, 485 S.E.2d at 586; O.C.GA § 44-14-162.2(a) (1982).
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such other address as the debtor may designate by written notice to the
secured creditor."" 7 Wright contended that Barnett was on notice that
her address had changed because Barnett had previously delivered
notices to her at her new address."2 However, it was undisputed that
Wright had not given written notice to Barnett as required under section
44-14-162.2. The court held, therefore, that Barnett had complied with
the notice requirements
of section 44-14-162.2 and that the foreclosure
129
was proper.

Based on the reasoning of Zeller v. Home Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n,'" which was discussed in last year's survey,"3 '
Barnett
sought sanctions against Wright for a frivolous appeal.'
Although
the court declined to award sanctions against Wright, the strong
concurring opinion by Justice Smith indicates that another appeal on
this issue will be dealt with harshly."
The holding in Southeast 71mberlands, Inc. v. Haiseal Umber,Inc.'"
pertained to an issue similar to that presented in Baby Days, Inc. v.
Bank of Adairsville,5 5 which was discussed in last year's survey-the
interplay between foreclosure on real estate when the debtor is subject
to independent obligations and the need to confirm the sale."
Southeast Timberlands purchased real estate from Haiseal Timber and
executed a promissory note in Haiseal's favor for a portion of the
purchase price. The promissory note was secured by a deed to secure
debt, which referenced the note.'7 The security deed included a clause
that provided that Southeast Timberlands had the right to have portions
of the property released from the security deed upon paying Haiseal
eighty percent of the proceeds gained from sales of timber from those
tracts of secured property.1"

127. 226 Ga. App. at 96, 485 S.E.2d at 585.
128. Id. at 94, 485 S.E.2d at 584.
129. I& at 97, 485 S.E.2d at 586.
130. 220 Ga. App. 843, 471 S.E.2d 1 (1996).
131. T. Daniel Brannan et al., Real Property,48 MERCER L. REv. 455, 480-81 (1996).
132. Barnett argued that "the similarity between the two cases is uncanny.'" 226 Ga.
App. at 99, 485 S.E.2d at 586 (Smith, J., concurring specially)).
133. Id.
134. 224 Ga. App. 98, 479 S.E.2d 443 (1996).
135. 218 Ga. App. 752,463 S.E.2d 171 (1995) (discussed in Brannan et al., supra note
131, at 482).
136. 224 Ga. App. at 101, 479 S.E.2d at 446-47.
137. The note was also secured by a personal guaranty from Southeast Timberlands'
president, Jewett Tucker. Id., 479 S.E.2d at 446. Because Tuckers liability is not material
to the outcome of the case, his claims will not be discussed separately.
138. Id. at 99, 479 S.E.2d at 444-45.
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Southeast Timberlands contracted with both Thompson Hardwoods,
Inc. and S.M. Baxter Timber Company, granting them the right to
harvest timber on certain tracts of the secured property (the "Thompson
tract" and the "Baxter tract," respectively). However, before Southeast
Timberlands' contract with Thompson closed, Haiseal released its
security interest in the Thompson tract. Southeast Timberlands received
payment in full under its contracts with Thompson and Baxter but paid
Haiseal less than eighty percent of the proceeds it received from the
timber harvests on the Thompson and Baxter tracts.' 89
Southeast Timberlands failed to make its scheduled payments under
the note and security deed. Consequently, Haiseal foreclosed upon most
of the property described in the security deed. However, Haiseal
inadvertently omitted the Thompson tract from the foreclosure.
Although the foreclosure sale resulted in a deficiency under the note of
$350,000, Haiseal did not confirm the foreclosure price.' ° Thereafter,
Haiseal filed a complaint against Southeast Timberlands alleging that
"Southeast breached the covenant contained in the deed to secure debt
to pay [eighty] percent of the timber sale proceeds to Haisea." 141
Haiseal sought to recover the difference between what it had been paid
for timber harvested on the Thompson and Baxter tracts and a sum
equal to eighty percent of what Southeast Timberlands had received
from those harvests. Southeast filed motions for summary judgment and
for directed verdict arguing that Haiseal's action was one seeking to
recover a "deficiency" and was precluded by Haiseal's failure to confirm
the foreclosure sale. The trial court denied both motions, and Southeast'
Timberlands appealed. 42
For reasons that will become apparent, the court analyzed Southeast
Timberlands' arguments on appeal separately as they related to the
Thompson and Baxter tracts. First, the court acknowledged that when
the debtor has an "obligation which is independent, unsecured and
separate from its obligation under the note," the creditor is not barred
from suing on that remaining obligation even without confirming
foreclosure of the secured property.1'
However, the court rejected
Haiseal's argument that Southeast Timberlands' obligation to remit

139. Id.
140. Id. Haiseal did commence a confirmation action but dismissed its petition before
obtaining a ruling from the court. Id.
141. Id. at 99-100, 479 S.E.2d at 445. The complaint also "allege[d] that [Mr.] Tucker
was liable based on his personal guarantee" of the note. Id. at 100, 479 S.E.2d at 445.
142. Id. at 100, 479 S.E.2d at 445.
143. Id., 479 S.E.2d at 446 (citing Kennedy v. Trust Co. Bank, 160 Ga. App. 733, 288
S.E.2d 87 (1981); Baby Days, Inc. v. Bank of Adairsville, 218 Ga. App. 752, 463 S.E.2d 171
(1995)).
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proceeds from timber harvested on the secured property was independent of its obligation to pay the underlying note. 1" The court relied
on the fact that there was only one promissory note and one deed to
secure debt, and it reasoned that the provision was "inextricably
intertwined" in the security deed that allowed Southeast to satisfy the
debt by paying Haiseal a portion of the timber proceeds from the secured
property. 5 Because Haiseal had not confirmed the foreclosure sale
with regard to the Baxter tract, the court held Southeast Timberlands
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Haiseal's claim to
proceeds from that tract.'"
With regard to the Thompson tract, Southeast Timberlands argued
that it was entitled to judgment because Haiseal relinquished all its
rights to timber proceeds by executing the quitclaim deed. The court
agreed. 47 Therefore, the court was not required to determine whether
the action with regard to the Thompson tract was one for a deficiency
Haiseal never foreclosed on that portion of the
judgment even though
4
secured property.1 8
It is important to note that the opinion as it relates to the Thompson
tract was endorsed only by a plurality of the court. Justices Blackburn
and Smith concurred specially in the result of the main opinion. 49
However, they, along with the three dissenting justices, disagreed with
the plurality view of Haiseal's quitclaim deed. As a result, a majority
believed that Haiseal's claim to a portion of the proceeds of timber from
the Thompson tract was not released by the execution of that deed."6
However, Justices Blackburn and Smith concluded that Haiseal's action
was for a deficiency even with regard to the proceeds from the Thompson
tract and was therefore barred as a matter of law.' 51
The authors believe that the concurring opinion correctly analyzes the
issues regarding the Thompson tract. As Justice Blackburn wrote,
"Haiseal foreclosed, it failed to confirm, and it may not now sue for a
deficiency whether or not it failed to foreclose on a portion of the
property described in the single security deed."' 2 Any other outcome
could result in secured parties foreclosing on all but a small portion of
secured property, bidding in unconscionably low sums, then suing the

144.
145.
146.
147.
'148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 101, 479 S.E.2d at 446.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 101-02, 479 S.E.2d at 446-47.
Id.
Id. at 102, 479 S.E.2d at 447 (Blackburn, J., concurring specially).
See id.; 224 Ga. App. at 106, 479 S.E.2d at 450 (McMurray, P.J., dissenting).
224 Ga. App. at 102-04,479 S.E.2d at 447-48 (Blackburn, J., concurring specially).
Id., 479 S.E.2d at 447.
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debtor for deficiency based on the fact that not all the property was
foreclosed. That would clearly be contrary to the purpose of the
confirmation statute.'"

VII. EMINENT DOMAIN AND CONDEMNATION
Banks v. Georgia Power Co.' involved an appeal challenging the
constitutionality of O.C.G.A. section 22-3-20,'" which permits condemnation of private property by corporations that generate and distribute
electric power. Georgia Power sought to condemn land owned by Banks
pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 22-2-100.16 Banks contended that the
statute was unconstitutional because it provided no objective criteria to
determine the necessity for such a condemnation." 7
However, the court concluded that the power company's authority to
condemn was sufficiently restricted by the language of O.C.G.A section
23-2-20 and by court decisions so that it withstood Banks' constitutional
challenge.'" First, the court stated that, by enacting that Code
section, the legislature delegated the power to condemn property to
Georgia Power and other similar entities. 59 That delegation was
constitutional if "the purpose and policy of the legislation are clearly
provided, although the method, details, making of subordinate rules, and
the determination of facts to which the policy is to apply are deferred to
another."" The court found that the purpose of O.C.G.A. section 22-320 was sufficiently clear from the terms of the statute.'6 '
Second, the court stated that section 23-2-20 restricts the power

company's right of condemnation to property that is to be used to "'carry
on...

activities necessary for constructing and operating' a plant for

153. See O.C.GA. § 44-14-101 (1982).
154. 267 Ga. 602, 481 S.E.2d 200 (1997).
155. O.C.GA § 22-3-20 (1982). Section 22-3.20 states:
Any person operating or constructing or preparing to construct a plant for
generating electricity shall have the right to purchase, lease, or condemn rights
of way or other easements over the lands of others in order to run power lines,
maintain dams, flow backwater, or carry on other activities necessary for
constructing and operating such a plant, provided that the person first pays just
compensation to the owner of the land to be affected.
O.C.GA. § 22-3-20.
156. 267 Ga. at 602, 481 S.E.2d at 200 (citing O.C.GA § 22-2-100 (1997)).
157. Id at 603, 481 S.E.2d at 202.
158. I& (citing Nolan v. Central Ga. Power Co., 134 Ga. 201, 67 S.E. 656 (1910);
Piedmont Cotton Mills v. Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co., 131 Ga. 129, 62 S.E. 52 (1908); Jones
v. North Ga. Elec. Co., 125 Ga. 618, 54 S.E. 85 (1906)).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Ld.at 604-05, 481 S.E.2d at 202-03.
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generating electricity."1' 2 The court found that the power company's
rights were further restricted by the principle that property may only be
condemned if it is "'useful, needful, and necessary for public purposes. ' "1 3 The court opined that property used for "the provision of
electrical power for distribution and sale to the general public" was,
without doubt, put to a public purpose. 4
Finally, although the court acknowledged that O.C.G.A. section 22-320 allows the power companies some discretion to determine what
property is "necessary" to provide electric power, that "discretion is not
unfettered."'
Under Georgia law, all condemning authorities must
act in good faith in identifying property to be condemned." Based on
all these facts, the court concluded by finding that providing electric
power to the general public is a public enterprise and property used for
such purposes is devoted to a public use."7 Therefore, O.C.G.A.
section 22-3-20 delegates only the authority reasonably necessary for a
public purpose and is constitutional. 1"
Woods v. Department of Transportation" is potentially a very
significant decision for the plaintiff's bar. In that case the Department
of Transportation ("DOT") filed a condemnation petition and deposited
seventy-six thousand dollars into the court registry as just and adequate
compensation. Woods was dissatisfied with the amount and appealed to
a jury pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 32-3-14.1"0 Before trial, the DOT's
appraiser increased his valuation of the property to ninety thousand
dollars, but the DOT failed to tender any additional amount into the
court registry. At trial the jury awarded Woods $162,000, and a final
judgment was entered. Thereafter, Woods filed a motion seeking to
recover attorney fees under O.C.G.A. section 9-15-14.'71 The trial court
denied that motion based solely on its conclusion that section 9-15-14 is
not applicable in eminent domain cases. Woods appealed. 72

162.

Id. at 603, 481 S.E.2d at 203 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 22-3-20).

163. Id. at 604, 481 S.E.2d at 203 (quoting Piedmont Cotton Mills v. Georgia R.W. &
Elec. Co., 131 Ga. 129, 136, 62 S.E. 52, 55 (1908)).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. (citing Miles v. Brown, 223 Ga. 557, 156 S.E.2d 898 (1967)).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 605, 481 S.E.2d at 203.
169. 225 Ga. App. 29, 482 S.E.2d 396 (1997), cert. granted, 1997 Ga. LEXIS 544.
170. See O.C.G.A. § 32-3-14 (1996).
171. O.C.GA. § 9-15-14 (1993 & Supp. 1997).
172. 225 Ga. App. at 29, 482 S.E.2d at 396. In fact, the court granted Woods'
application for discretionary appeal. Id.
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After a lengthy analysis, the court of appeals reversed the trial court
decision.17 The court began its analysis by acknowledging the historical rule that the phrase "justand adequate compensation" as contained
in the Georgia Constitution did not include the condemnee's attorney
fees and expenses of litigation. 1 4 However, the court opined that a
provision added to the Georgia Constitution in 1983 somewhat altered
the general rule. 175 Article I, section 3, paragraph 1(d) states: "The
General Assembly may provide by law for the payment by the condemnor of reasonable expenses, including Attorneys' fees, incurred by the
condemnee in determining just and adequate compensation." 7 '
O.C.G.A. section 9-15-14, enacted in 1986, provides that under certain
circumstances a trial court is authorized to award attorney fees in "any
civil action."'77 The court in Woods reasoned that the plain and clear
language of O.C.G.A. section 9-15-14 established the intent of the
General Assembly that the statute should apply to condemnation
proceedings because "a condemnation proceeding is a 'civil action.'"' 78
Therefore, the court concluded that the trial court erred by refusing to
award Woods' fees and expenses without considering whether the DOT
"unnecessarily expanded the proceedings by improper conduct" (that is,
offering less than one-half what the jury awarded). 79
As stated at the outset of this discussion, the holding in Woods may
significantly affect the practice of attorneys representing condemnees.
If the DOT (and presumably other condemning authorities) face liability
for the condemnee's attorney fees in addition to a high value award, the
DOT will have an incentive to make more reasonable offers of payment
before litigation commences. However, the supreme court has granted
the DOT's petition for certiorari in this case."' It remains to be seen
whether the supreme court will agree with the court of appeals and
whether Woods will remain the law in Georgia.
In Butler v. Gwinnett County,'8 ' Gwinnett County ("County")
condemned portions of the plaintiffs' property for use as an access lane
on the Ronald Reagan Parkway. The County and plaintiffs entered

173. Id. at 31, 482 S.E.2d at 398.
174. Id. at 29-30, 482 S.E.2d at 396-97 (citing DeKalb County v. Trustees, Decatur
Lodge, 242 Ga. 707, 251 S.E.2d 243 (1978)).
175. Id. at 31, 482 S.E.2d at 397.
176, GA. CONST. art. I, § 3, para. 1(d). Note the addition of this subparagraph was
made after the decision in Trustees, Decatur Lodge.
177. 225 Ga. App. at 30, 482 S.E.2d at 397 (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 31, 482 S.E.2d at 397-98.
180. Department of Transp. v. Woods, 1997 Ga. LEXIS 544.
181. 223 Ga. App. 703, 479 S.E.2d 11 (1996).
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consent decrees pursuant to which the County paid plaintiffs more than
the value of their condemned property as appraised by the County. Two
years later, after the road work was completed, plaintiffs filed an action
against the County based primarily on damages allegedly arising from
the construction of the access lane. 2 Plaintiffs alleged in that action
that the construction of the access lane had damaged their remaining
property. The County moved for summary judgment on the basis of the
previous consent orders resolving the condemnation action two years
prior. That motion was granted, and plaintiffs appealed."s
On appeal plaintiff Butler sought to avoid preclusion due to the prior
condemnation proceedings by characterizing the new claim as negligent
construction of the access lane that had damaged the remaining property
through "noise, pollution, erosion, and other problems.""' The court
acknowledged that even though a condemnation proceeding is conclusive
as to all damages resulting from proper construction "'whether foreseen
or not,'"'" damages caused by negligent or improper construction on
condemned property "are recoverable in a suit separate from the
condemnation proceeding.""
However, based on the testimony of
plaintiffs' expert witness, the court concluded that the damages sought
by the suit were not caused by negligent construction. 8 7
In order to avoid the effect of their own expert's testimony, plaintiffs
argued that a jury could find negligent or improper construction as a
result of negligent design. However, plaintiffs cited no authority to
support that argument.T M The court noted that plaintiffs' argument,
if accepted, would permit "unending inverse condemnation and damage
claims from property owners who decide, after construction, that the
improvement's design impacts them in a way they did not anticipate."' 9 The court reasoned that regardless of whether plaintiffs
anticipated the consequential damages that allegedly resulted from the

182. Id. at 703, 479 S.E.2d at 12. Plaintiffs' claims were couched as "negligent,
construction, nuisance, inverse condemnation, trespass, negligent misrepresentation,
fraudulent inducement, and breach of contract." Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 704, 479 S.E.2d at 12-13.
185. Id., 479 S.E.2d at 13 (quoting Fulton County v. Woodside, 223 Ga. 316, 319, 155
S.E.2d 404, 408 (1967)).
186. Id. (citing Georgia Power Co. v. Jones, 122 Ga. App. 614, 178 S.E.2d 265 (1970)).
187. Id. Plaintiffs' expert testified in pertinent part as follows: "I'm not complaining
or Pm not really talking about negligence in construction because as far as I know the
construction was done exactly as it was planned and designed, so I'm not talking about the
construction by the contractor .... " Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 705, 479 S.E.2d at 13.
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road work, the damages had to be recovered, if at all, in the condemnation proceedings."9 8 Plaintiffs' nuisance and trespass claims also failed
because they simply restated a claim for compensation for the prior
taking. The compensation plaintiffs received in the prior condemnation
proceeding precluded the bringing of such an action. Based on these
findings, the
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary
19
judgment. '
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS CASES
In Kruzel v. Leeds Building Products, Inc.,"9 Leslie Kruzel allegedly
entered into an oral contract with Civil Structures, Inc. ("CSI") for the
construction of a house on property she owned. Ms. Kruzel's father was
the president and CEO of CSI. Kruzel claimed to have obtained
financing for the cost of construction from Wildwood Properties, a
company also controlled by her father. Kruzel executed a security deed
in favor of Wildwood.'9
Leeds Building Products, Inc. ("Leeds") and other materialmen filed
claims of lien against the property. Leeds brought an action seeking,
among other things, cancellation of the security deed to Wildwood and
appointment of a receiver. After a hearing, the trial court appointed a
receiver to complete construction of the house and then to liquidate the
property. Kruzel appealed that order.'
The supreme court stated that a receiver may be appointed "to take
and hold 'any assets charged with the payment of debts where there is
manifest danger of loss, destruction, or material injury to those
interested.'"'
The evidence before the trial court showed that the
house was unoccupied and had been vandalized, that no repairs had
been made to the house, and that the house was threatened with further
damage.'
Furthermore, the record indicated a very strong possibility
of fraudulent collusion between Ms. Kruzel and the contractor intended
to defeat the materialmen's liens.'
Based on those facts, the court
concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by appointing
a receiver."

190. Id. at 704, 479 S.E.2d at 13.
191. Id. at 705-06, 479 S.E.2d at 13-14.
192. 266 Ga. 765, 470 S.E.2d 882 (1996).
193. Id. at 765, 470 S.E.2d at 883.
194. Id. at 766, 470 S.E.2d at 883.
195. Id. (quoting O.C.GA. § 9-8-3 (1982)).
196. Id.
197. Id
198. Id at 767, 470 S.E.2d at 884. The court also found that Ms. Kruzel's "offer" did
not preclude the trial court's finding. Under the Georgia Mechanics' and Materialmen's
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However, the court of appeals did reverse the portion of the trial court
ruling granting the receiver authority to liquidate the property.' ° A
trial court may only authorize an appointed receiver to liquidate assets
in the case of "'some emergency which creates an immediate necessity'
therefor.' ° From the record on appeal, the appellate court concluded
that the trial court had not made a finding of an emergency sufficient to
support liquidation of the property before trial. 1

LX. LEGISLATE DEVELOPMENTS
There were several significant legislative enactments during the past
year, most of which relate to security interests in real estate. First,
O.C.G.A. section 44-14-1 was amended to permit the use of open-ended
security clauses by the assignees and transferees of security interests in
home equity credit lines.'
Advances made by the assignee or transferee after the assignment or transfer retain the priority of the advances
made by the original creditor if those later advances "were authorized by
the original
parties to the home equity line of credit agreement or con2
tract.n"
Second, O.C.G.A. section 44-14-361.1 was amended to clarify the
procedure for foreclosing a mechanic's or materialman's lien filed against
realty by a subcontractor or materialman. '° Generally, a subcontractor or materialman who holds a lien and is not in direct contractual
privity with the owner is required to commence an action against the

Lien Act, Ms. Kruzel had the unilateral right to post a bond throughout the action but had
failed to do so. Id. (citing O.C.GA. § 44-14-364 (1991 & Supp. 1997)). Under those
circumstances, "a mere offer to give a bond was not an adequate substitute for the
appointment of a receiver.' Id at 766, 470 S.E.2d at 884.
199. Id
200. Id. (quoting Coker v. Norman, 162 Ga. 238, 238, 133 S.E. 243, 244 (1926)).
201. l
202. 1997 Ga. Laws 712, § 1 (codified at O.C.G.A. 4414-1(b), (c) (Supp. 1997)).
203. O.C.GA § 44-14-1(c) (Supp. 1997). There is an ambiguity created by quoted
language relating to the timing of the "authorization" and the mechanism by which it may
be given. However, it could be argued that the original lender may give its authorization
for additional advances simply by establishing the original maximum credit limit on a
revolving credit line. With home equity credit lines of that type, the debtor is able to take
advances up to a fixed amount (that is, the total that may be borrowed is "pre-authorized"
by the creditor). Therefore, as the debtor pays down the amount due on his or her equity
credit line, additional advances taken within that credit limit after transfer or assignment
to a new creditor should be deemed "authorized" by the original creditor. Of course, the
debtor should also be deemed to have "authorized" those additional advances.
204. 1997 Ga. Laws 829, § 1 (codified at O.C.GA. § 44-14-361.1(aX4) (Supp. 1997)). As
explained, this amendment will have little effect on general contractors and others in direct
privity of contract with the owner of the construction project.
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general contractor within twelve months from the date he last performed
work on the property.2" 5 The commencement of this action is generally
a condition precedent to the lienholder's right to file an action to
foreclose the lien. Previously, there were two exceptions to that general
rule-when the general contractor (1) dies or leaves the state; or (2)
declares bankruptcy. In those instances the subcontractor or materialman was permitted to file an action directly against the owner without
first suing the general contractor.2"
The recent amendment created another exception to the general rule
requiring an action against the general contractor. The lienholder may
now foreclose its lien without suing the general contractor when the
lienholder's contract for the work contains a so-called "pay-when-paid"
clause.'
Pay-when-paid clauses condition the general contractor's
obligation to pay its subcontractors and materialmen on receipt by the
general contractor of payment for the work from the owner.2"'
Third, the legislature created a mechanism by which the owners of
real property may have nonconforming liens removed from the land
records. 2" A nonconforming lien is defined as any lien not provided
for in Chapter 14 of Title 44, not specifically established by statute, or
not included in a written declaration or covenant.21
To have a
nonconforming lien removed from the land records, the affected
landowner or the landowner's attorney may file an ex parte petition and
obtain a court order directing the superior court clerk to record the order
and cancel the nonconforming lien." A copy
of the nonconforming
21 2
lien is required to be attached to the petition.
Two significant statutory amendments that affect real property are not
codified in Title 44. The first is found in the Georgia Hazardous Sites
Response Act ("HSRA7). 2 11 O.C.G.A. section 12-8-96 was amended to
create a lien on property for which funds from the hazardous waste trust
fund ("Fund") are expended.2 4 The lien created by O.C.G.A. section
12-8-96(e) benefits the State of Georgia as the holder of the Fund. The

205. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1(a)(3) (Supp. 1997).
206. Id. § 44-14-361.1(a)(4) (1996).
207. Id. § 44-14-361.1(a)(4).

208. See D.I. Corbett Elec., Inc. v. Venture Constr. Co., 140 Ga. App. 586, 231 S.E.2d
536, 537 (1976) (subcontract provided final payment to subcontractor was to be made
"'within 30 days after completion of the work included in this subcontract, written acceptance of same by the Architect and Owner .... and full payment therefor by the owner").
209. 1997 Ga. Laws 970, § 2 (codified at O.C.GA.. § 44-14-320(b), (c) (Supp. 1997)).
210. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-320(b).
211. Id. § 44-14-320(c).
212. Id.
213. 1997 Ga. Laws 1050, § 1 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 12-8-96(e) (Supp. 1997)).
214. O.C.G.A. § 12-8-96(e).
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State's claim is perfected by the filing of a claim of lien identifying the
property affected and stating the type of corrective action taken, the
authority pursuant to which the corrective action is taken, the date the
corrective action began, the cost of the corrective action to date, and the
estimated total cost of the claim.21 After the claim of lien is filed, the
State must send copies of the lien to the owner of the property and all
persons believed to be liable for the cost of the corrective action.216
Significantly for secured lenders and other lienholders, liens created and
perfected pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 12-8-96(e) do not take priority
over prior recorded liens and security interests. However, foreclosure of
this type of lien
does not divest the State's lien, which remains against
2 17
the property.
The legislature created an important exception to O.C.G.A. section 128-96(e) liens. No lien may be asserted
where the present owner of the real property ... did not cause or

contribute to a release which resulted in the expenditure of hazardous
waste trust funds upon the property, unless that owner knew or in the
exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that the release
was occurring during his or her period of ownership or that the release
had occurred prior to his or her acquisition of ownership.2
That exception was clearly intended to provide a safe haven for those
real estate owners who qualify as "innocent landowners" and so avoid
liability for corrective action costs under HSRA. 19 However, the
language of O.C.G.A. section 12-8-96(e) does not track precisely the text
of the Code sections creating the innocent landowners defense to HSRA
liability.220 Whether those differences in the language of the statute
will have any meaningful effect on the application of the liens remains
to be decided.

215. Id
216. Id When section 12-8-96(e) liens are foreclosed, the funds generated, after paying
off prior liens and security interests in the property, are to be deposited in the Fund. Id.

217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. § 12-8-96.1(cX3) (1996). O.C.G.A. § 12-8-96.1(c)(3) excepts from liability for
response costs persons who can show
by a preponderance of the evidence that the release of a hazardous waste... was
caused solely by [aln act or omission of a third party ... if [that] person
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that [he had no relationship with
the third party nor exercised any control over activities of the third party and [hie
took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and
the consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts or omissions.
220. Compare O.C.G.A. § 12-8-96(e) with § 12-8-96.1(cX3)(A), (B).
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The final legislative action during the survey period that is likely to
have significant impact on real property law is the enactment of the
Georgia Electronic Records and Signatures Act ("Electronic Signatures
Act"). 1 Under the Electronic Signatures Act, parties to a transaction
may agree "to be bound by an electronic record executed or adopted with
an electronic signature."2u If the parties agree, the contract or
documents they execute will be deemed to satisfy "[any rule of law
which requires a signature" and "[amny rule of law which requires a
record of that type to be in writing.' 2 Therefore, documents subject
to the statute of frauds, including documents transferring title to land,
Certainly, it will take
may now be executed by electronic signature.'
some time for the full impact of the Electronic Signatures Act to be
realized. However, the authors fully expect that practitioners will soon
start seeing its impact in their daily practices.
X. CONCLUSION
As discussed above, the courts addressed numerous issues of first
impression during the survey period. In fact, the authors do not recall
a period in recent years when so many cases created new legal
principles. The holdings from these cases are likely to be carried
forward and applied in new situations in the coming years. It will be
interesting to see how far they ultimately reach and what impact they
will have on related areas of law.

221. 1997 Ga. Laws 1052, § 1 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 10-12-1 to -5 (Supp. 1997)).
222. O.C.G.A. § 10-12-4.
223. Id.
224. I& The Electronic Signatures Act defines an electronic signature as "an electronic
or digital method executed or adapted by a party with the intent to be bound by or to
authenticate a record." Id. § 10-12-3(1). To be effective, the signature must be "unique to
the person using it, ... capable of verification .... under the sole control of the person
using it, and ... linked to the data in such a manner that if the data are changed the
electronic signature is invalidated." Id.

